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Ubiquitous Human Computing 
BY JONATHAN ZITTRAIN
† 
University of Oxford, Oxford Internet Institute 
1 St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3JS, United Kingdom 
Ubiquitous computing means network connectivity everywhere, linking devices and systems 
as small as a thumb tack and as large as a worldwide product distribution chain. What could 
happen when people are so readily networked? This essay explores issues arising from two 
possible emerging models of ubiquitous human computing: fungible networked brainpower and 
collective personal vital sign monitoring. 
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1.  Introduction 
We are nearing a world of cheap and plentiful sensors, fast processors, and high-speed 
saturating wireless networks. Together these may allow computing to be far from the people 
initiating it and using its results. They also may allow much human thinking to be as far as we 
like from the people initiating it and using its results. Networks connect people as well as 
devices, and when they are cheap and easy to use it means that those intellectual tasks more 
efficiently performed elsewhere by other people can be broken out and distributed. 
Sensors can connect people’s bodies as well as their brainpower to the network.  The sensors 
we currently use to remotely monitor industrial equipment, automobile traffic flows, and 
livestock provide a model for deployment to people, recording and relaying a spectrum of 
individuals’ vital signs for a variety of purposes. Both forms of human computing – distributed 
networks of people who think in small, discrete slices for others, and distributed networks of 
people comprising a collective pulse for a particular geographic region or polity – raise ethical 
issues. Although we cannot predict exactly the issues that will arise, if we can forge a coherent 
philosophy of what we want and what we cannot accept in these areas, we will find these 
networks easier to regulate as they come about. 
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2.  Distributed human brainpower 
We are in the initial stages of distributed human computing that can be directed at mental 
tasks the way that surplus remote server rackspace or Web hosting can be purchased to 
accommodate sudden spikes in Internet traffic (von Ahn 2005; Hewlett Packard (HP) 2008) or 
PCs can be arranged in grid computing configurations, each executing code in an identical 
virtual environment (International Business Machines (IBM) 2006). At some fast food drive-
throughs, the microphone and speaker next to the marquee menu are patched through to an 
order-taker thousands of miles away. That person types up the requested order and dispatches it 
back to a screen in the food preparation area of the restaurant while the car is idling (Richtel 
2006). Services like LiveOps recruit workers for such mental contracting tasks  (LiveOps 2008a). 
Applicants to LiveOps navigate a fully automated hours-long vetting system that tests their 
skills and suitability. Out of 2,000 applicants per week, roughly 40 emerge for a second round of 
interviews by LiveOps managers (LiveOps 2008b). 
Those who succeed and become contractors for firms like LiveOps encounter an unusual 
combination of freedom and control. They can work whenever they like, wherever they like, for 
as much or as little time as they like. When they log in to work they choose from a menu of 
assignments tailored to their skill and reputation levels. These might include taking pizza orders, 
placing sales calls, lobbying for a political candidate, or handling customer service inquiries. 
Then there is the control: every call and transaction is measured and recorded. Interactions can 
be monitored live by fellow LiveOps mentors or official LiveOps managers, or pulled up later as 
part of a larger assessment of contractors’ work. Judgments are developed and recorded about 
contractors’ performance, such that an incoming pizza order can be routed to the best pizza-
order-taker – who may not be the same as the best political campaigner (Hornik 2007). 
Contractors can be de-accredited at any time.  
The rise of the mental contractor factotum is not limited to the disaggregation of human-to-
human consumer transactions, which might be viewed as merely an extension of phenomena like 
the outsourcing of medical X-ray analyses to less costly overseas radiologists (Nyberg & Lanziere 
2006-07). Cheap networks mean that nearly any mental task can become unbundled, no matter 
how minor. Marketplaces like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk enumerate “HITs” – human 
intelligence tasks – for sale one unit at a time, from as low as $0.01 to as high as $10.00. Recent 
HITs include using one’s mouse to highlight the specific pavement area of bus stops on pictures 
of city streets; leaving positive topical comments on particular blogs; and collecting case write-
ups from MBA students (Amazon Mechanical Turk 2008). On the upper end of the scale are 
marketplaces like InnoCentive, where bounties are placed on answers to minor scientific 
problems, and people from around the world compete to be the first to answer, netting the 
bounty in exchange for giving all intellectual property rights in the solution to the purchaser. 
One can visualize in the near future a subway car packed with people, each far less attuned to 
the local environment and to each than with today’s distractions of newspapers and iPods. 
Instead they will stare into screens even for just a few minutes and earn as much money in that 
time as their respective skills and stations allow. 
2 Other human intelligence tasks take place without payment to, or even the awareness of, the 
people performing the tasks. Von Ahn and Dabbish’s (2004) pioneering ESP Game comprises a 
Web site where people are shown images and then guess labels for them. When their guesses 
match those of other anonymous players, they score points and the images are labeled with their 
tags. The points have no extrinsic value. Tens of thousands of people have played the game, 
many for 40 hours a week. They created more than 10 million labels within a few months (von 
Ahn 2006). Google has licensed von Ahn’s technology for use in sustaining its image search 
(Google Image Labeler 2008). Von Ahn has also created reCAPTCHA, a system that rides the 
coattails of the standard captcha, where Web surfers are asked to type in a word to match a 
difficult-to-read graphic image of a word in order to prove that they are people and not robots. 
reCAPTCHA provides two words instead of one in random order: one is the captcha test word, 
and the other is a word from a scanned text that has defied attempts at optical character 
recognition. Through reCAPTCHA, human brains are employed one word at a time to complete 
the accurate scanning of old texts somewhere in the world (Captcha 2008). 
Systems like these can encompass myriad tasks such as language translation, household or 
border monitoring (“How many people do you see in this video, and what are they doing?”), and 
classifying over one million newly-discovered galaxies (Zittrain 2008; Distributed Computing 
2008). Some may be created for purposes likely at odds with the values of their contributors. 
For example, spammers have sought ways to fill out captchas that do not require hiring 
humans. They have created Web sites and software that offer free pornography. A user is 
prompted to answer a captcha before he or she can proceed – with the captcha’s image drawn 
from an unrelated site where the spammer wishes to post a comment. When the user answers 
the captcha, the answer is transmitted back to the spammer’s computer, which can then provide 
the answer to the target site providing the initial image (British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) 2007). 
3.  Distributed human sensors 
One form of ubiquitous human computing – the distributed human brainpower described 
above – stands to dissolve some of the longstanding networks of the traditional firm and its 
physical workplace and career workforce. Another form – distributed human sensors – will 
create a new kind of network to govern and monitor citizens. We can contribute to a fungible 
set of disembodied pulses as well as to one of disembodied mindpower. 
Today we have remote sensors to monitor the location and status of personal and corporate 
assets, including cars, shipping containers, and cattle (Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)  
2008). Early theft deterrent systems designed to locate and disable stolen vehicles have 
diversified into full-fledged traffic monitoring schemes. With enough cars reporting location and 
speed to each other or to a central coordinator, traffic snarls can be instantly identified – and 
nearby cars advised to re-route both to help individual drivers and to ease overall congestion 
(Johnson 2007). Today several states place radio frequency identifiers into passports, allowing 
them – and their holders – to be counted and identified at short distances (U.S. Department of 
State 2007). Mobile phone providers use cellular tower triangulation to count the location, 
3 number, and identity of gatherings of people, knowing how many (and perhaps who) attended a 
sporting event or a political rally (Taipei Times 2008). A variety of needs could leverage these 
programs into a ubiquitous weather map of human vital signs, inferring patterns of illness and 
mass emotion through basic physical indicators. Here the human sensor networks would be 
notable for precisely for the variations from one person or group to the next, rather than human 
computing’s implicit aim to make mental cycles an undifferentiated commodity. 
Initial motivating factors include older citizens seeking continued independence from 
retirement homes by having their vital signs continuously monitored for signs of trouble (Dulay 
et al. 2005; Komninos and Stamou 2006); health insurance that would trade such monitoring in 
exchange for discounts on premiums; and a desire for early warning against (and epidemiological 
tracing of) either naturally- or artificially-sourced communicable disease ranging from bird flu to 
hemorrhagic fever. Indeed, some systems not only monitor vital signs but allow for the remotely-
administered injection of drugs into people connected to the network (Brown and Adams 2008). 
In addition to citizens who choose to subscribe to such monitoring, coordinated and mandated 
deployment could take place within military or law enforcement circles to monitor their soldiers 
and officers, or public health authorities insisting that front line medical professionals be wired 
up. 
Once achieving critical mass, a human sensor net with variables as modest as personal 
identity, pulse rate, and temperature could become vital for many uses, especially in states that 
strike a balance towards collective rather than individual privacy when the two are in tension – 
or that are outright authoritarian. Law enforcement will take readings on the public or officers 
on patrol for warning of riots or other anxiety-producing trouble, and first responders could use 
the sensor net to assure the evacuation of buildings and to identify people in need of assistance 
in the run up to or wake of a mass casualty event. 
As we become accustomed to less controversial uses of vital sign mapping, other variations 
could be incrementally introduced. If unique identifiers were integrated into individual 
telemetry, legal privileges could be authoritatively associated with each person – with extra 
scrutiny for those who fail to have a transponder at all. Biometric identifiers are entering into 
widespread use in public databases (Arena & Cratty 2008; Ignatius 2008). Just as police today 
can scan automatically the license plates of a row of cars to discover if any are stolen or not 
insured (Farivar 2005), drivers will be scanned at checkpoints to see if any are unlicensed, and 
states wishing to crack down on undocumented immigration could require a check of someone’s 
status as part of any financial transaction, or entry to any public establishment. The venerable 
practice of putting out an “all points bulletin” for a person of interest will be transformed into 
asking millions of distributed scanners to check for a particular identity and summon police if it 
is found. The parallel diffusion of radiofrequency identifiers into household products will allow 
researchers and plaintiffs’ lawyers to run very large scale statistical inquiries associating 
particular products with illness or death. 
4 4.  Issues arising from ubiquitous human computing 
The efficiencies gained by treating distributed brainpower the same as distributed computing 
power are tempered by the prospect of profound if more inchoate dignitary harms. 
First, when tasks and taskmasters can change or be changed by the minute, mental 
contractors cultivate no particular sense of affiliation to an employer or to a team, and they 
gain no sense of the larger enterprise for which they have been asked to perform just one small 
step. To be sure, LiveOps itself experiences very low turnover (LiveOps 2008c), indicating 
satisfaction – or at least the absence of desirable alternatives – among its contractors. But the 
disconnection between task and project, or task and project commissioner, can be even more 
severe with brainpower-harnessing tools like the ESP Game that need not innately signal that 
its use is performing epiphenomenal work for someone else. Alienation from the gestalt of one’s 
work is not a new phenomenon; the assembly line is the hallmark of an industrial economy. But 
distributed human computing risks extending the assembly line from the mechanical to the 
intellectual, spawning a new class of knowledge workers whose work lives are fully atomized, an 
existence blinkered even from fellow assembly line mates. The challenge will be to ensure that 
the technologies that supplant full time employment still enable human relationships to help the 
work stay meaningful and fulfilling, and to facilitate a form of career development among 
workers whose skills grow. 
Second, human computing’s freedom to work when and where desired creates new incentives 
and justifications for monitoring and control of that work beyond that of the traditional 
workplace. With the line between home and work fully transformed from physical to functional, 
those who commission the work can rightly claim to inspect all work-related activities. As each 
action and transaction is monitored and analyzed, the level of scrutiny we might apply to 
sensitive jobs like policing or day care can also be cost-effectively devoted to run-of-the-mill 
business transactions and communications. Such monitoring will be qualitatively different than 
that of the traditional workplace. It will likely be based upon metrics collected and analyzed by 
a higher force that has never met or engaged with the worker, and those metrics assessed 
through Bayesian-style statistics may not provide a narrative rationale for a judgment – only a 
statistical claim about its truth. Psychologists and political scientists agree that some amount of 
nonaccountability – the ability to tell a white lie, or to refuse a request with minimal 
explanation – actually facilitates social interaction, but ubiquitous monitoring can eliminate this 
slack space. (Iachello et al. 2005,) Gains in service quality through such strictures are thus offset 
to an unknown degree by the crush of the panopticon (Foucault 1979; Boyle 1997.) In 
discovering how to farm out through the Net the tasks that computers cannot do, we may find 
ourselves treating – and making – people more like computers. 
Third, disembodied HITs can deprive people of the chance to make judgments about the 
moral valence of their work. One can weigh whether to embark on a career with, say, a tobacco 
company, and even where such career choices are economically compelled (or legally compelled, 
as with military conscription), there are signals to relate one’s work to its effect on the world. 
For those HITs that are epiphenomenal – gleaned as a by-product of people’s activities rather 
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freedom to choose the goals that their intelligence will advance. Defense lawyers may be 
professionally obliged to assist the culpable with avoiding law’s consequences, but even in 
circumstances where they cannot choose (or cease representing) their clients, they can choose 
their profession overall, and they can invoke the crucial role their loyalty to clients plays in the 
larger system (Weiss 2005). For those whose game playing or Internet usage may be directly 
deployed for groups or causes they find repugnant, there is no such comfort. 
How and if these harms arise may depend on whether human computing itself is lessened as 
artificial intelligence improves, enlarging the set of tasks that can be fully automated by 
computers alone. In the meantime, human computing can develop humanely. 
First, harvesters of human mindpower can be encouraged – or perhaps required – to disclose 
their activities to those who benefit them. While no law specifically bans or regulates the 
practice of surreptitious HITs, restrictions found in many states on more general “unfair or 
deceptive trade practices” could be applied (Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 2006). Whether 
captcha-solving is deployed to scan an old book for a university library or to support the work 
of a particular religious institution or political party or spammer, the captcha-solver ought to 
know. Such knowledge will help develop and reinforce norms about what kinds of borrowed 
mental cycles are acceptable. 
Second, users might be given the opportunity to opt out. Google and other search engines 
use the corpus of webmasters’ linking behavior to help rank Web sites, but they also respect a 
robots.txt designation asking that they not harvest links from particular sites at all, and 
Google’s “#nofollow” designation provides a way for someone publishing a link to indicate that 
the link’s existence should not be marked as approval of its destination (Koster 2008; Google 
2005). Thus people can link to their enemies without elevating them, and more generally can see 
their contributions to collective computing as a choice freely given rather than one deviously or 
unavoidably extracted.  
Third, those who work in the new HIT markets ought to be able to take their reputations 
with them, building portfolios that can be offered to competing HIT markets and employers. In 
short, the constraints associated with physical work environments are absent when mental 
contractors work wherever they choose, but this need not moot the ideals motivating legal 
protections aimed to prevent exploitation in the workplace. Minimum wage, maximum working 
hours, unionization (or at least the ability to know and contact one’s co-workers) may be 
revisited to see if and how they should be adapted to distributed human computing, still 
knowing that each lessens freedom of contract. Each state could formulate its own policies, and 
firms like LiveOps could choose to recruit contractors from various jurisdictions depending on 
whether they wish to accede to that jurisdiction’s rules. A trickier question is how to treat those 
people who contribute without payment. Minimum wage requirements could kick in at a penny 
for a thought, but when they are given freely – whether as Wikipedia edits or as idle play of the 
ESP game – it would be significantly more intrusive to limit the transaction in the name of 
paternalism. Moreover, facilitating markets in ubiquitous human computing could affect the 
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Wikipedia, potential contributors to the latter might have been more primed to wonder why 
they should give away for free what otherwise commands a price, just as some worry that a 
market in human organs would stymie organ donations (Satel 2007). 
For the system of distributed human vital sign sensors, its undesirability might be thought 
to speak for itself, at least the moment that unique identifiers are introduced. But ubiquitous, 
unobtrusive sensors fool many of our natural protective mechanisms: we lack the normal social 
cues that remind us how much information we are broadcasting, and the sensors are easy to 
forget (Belloti & Sellen 1993). More important, our views of privacy are malleable (Taylor 2003; 
Vascellaro 2008), and often depend on the benefit we perceive in return for sharing information 
(Iachello et al. 2005). Public uptake of the foundational technologies for other reasons, combined 
with compelling use cases for the deployment into collective vital sign mapping, could bring 
such a system about. Will people be able to opt, temporarily or permanently, out without fear of 
extra scrutiny? Will we be able to design feedback systems that remind people of their 
participation in the system? Many salutary uses, such as early warning for contagious illness, do 
not require ubiquitous uptake, but others – such as license or status verification – depend on 
each person emanating his or her digital passport. 
Human sensor nets to detect and deal with disease outbreaks, such as E. coli from a tainted 
food source, could also create new vulnerabilities. They could facilitate more tightly coupled 
systems and thus less margin for error should the sensor net break down. For example, pressure 
to decentralize meat processing would lessen if outbreaks could be more efficiently contained 
than prevented in the first instance. Human vital sign monitoring, in addition to helping us 
respond to problems, could encourage a host of new ones. 
As these sensor systems emerge, their ranges of uses and abuses will be largely determined 
by who runs them – and how widely available and secure their data are. The methods we have 
developed for computer security today may not work with so many devices broadcasting 
information over wireless and ad hoc networks (Stajano 2002). Yet solutions that keep such data 
available only to the few will reduce its generative potential. We might wish anonymized 
information from the sensor net to be treated as many states treat raw weather data, gathered 
at government expense and distributed in real time to any who want to review it. The broader 
the availability of the anonymized data, the more uses can be made of it – and the more the 
public itself can choose to respond to what is found or synthesized with it. More broadly, we can 
project from the competing trajectories of today’s computing environment to frame the 
possibilities for tomorrow’s human one. The Internet faced down proprietary networks like 
CompuServe and America Online, and the PC largely supplanted dewdicated information 
appliances (Zittrain 2008). But the open and generative need not always trump the sterile and 
proprietary. Ubiquitous human computing – both as fungible brainpower and as collective 
physical monitoring – might arise in a proprietary fashion, with a small circle of public and 
private entities as gatekeepers to its use. Or it could unfold more organically, the way that the 
Internet’s byways are not owned in traditional ways. A ubiquitous human computing 
7 infrastructure that is “unowned” in the way the current Internet and its protocols are unowned 
will offer significantly different vectors of abuse and control than one run by a limited set of 
firms or sovereigns.  
5.  Conclusion 
Over the next fifteen years some of the most notable advances in computing will be in its 
relationship to people: distributing human mindpower to solve problems both large and tiny, 
and monitoring and ultimately altering people’s bodies and actions in ways previously 
impossible. These are not phenomena to be avoided so much as they are to be organized and 
perhaps regulated so that their ubiquity will enhance rather than debase the human condition. 
Shaping them will require an informed and widespread debate with tools drawn from many 
disciplines. Philosophers will attempt to construct a utilitarian calculus (Anderson 1991). 
Computing security professionals will ask what information we want to protect, and then seek to 
construct a security system (Stajano 2002). Without being able to foresee every problem ahead, 
it makes sense to reflect on the values we consider most important, such as autonomy, privacy, 
and health, and the case studies to place them appropriately in tension, so we can build and 
refine systems sensitive to them. 
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